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Abstract
Technology scaling leads to burn-in phase out and
increasing post-silicon test complexity, which increases
in-the-field error rate due to both latent defects and ac-
tual errors. As a consequence, there is an increasing
need for continuous on-line testing techniques to cope
with hard errors in the field. Similarly, those techniques
are needed for detecting soft errors in logic, whose error
rate is expected to raise in future technologies.
Cache memories, which occupy most of the area of
the chip, are typically protected with parity or ECC, but
most of the wires as well as some combinational blocks
remain unprotected against both soft and hard errors.
This paper presents a set of techniques to detect and
confine hard and soft errors in cache memories in com-
bination with parity/ECC at very low cost. By means of
hard signatures in data rows and error tracking, faults
can be detected, classified properly and confined for
hardware reconfiguration.
1 Introduction
Burn-in becomes less effective due to the high degra-
dation produced in otherwise well-functioning devices
and its cost increases with technology scaling. Thermal
runaway due to high leakage and longer test patterns due
to the increased gate count diminish the effectiveness of
burn-in [14]. Such effectiveness loss increases the like-
lihood of in-the-field failures due to rather small defects
(latent defects) and errors in hard-to-test corner cases.
Small latent defects become large enough during oper-
ation due to degradation and cause failures before the
target lifetime [4, 12].
Such failures are likely to appear in highly integrated
memories [3], and the failure rate is expected to worsen
in future technologies. Thus, techniques to detect and
correct failures in the field become a must. Moreover,
soft error rates in logic are expected to increase in fu-
ture technologies [11], which also calls for in-the-field
testing mechanisms.
While off-line testing methods such as data patterns
read/write can be adapted for on-line testing to some ex-
tent with some hardware support [19], their coverage is
poor because many errors only arise at particular envi-
ronmental situations (temperature, supply voltage, volt-
age droops, etc) and cannot be reproduced for periodic
tests [1, 8]. Furthermore, soft errors in logic can be
hardly detected by means of periodic tests. Thus, con-
tinuous on-line testing mechanisms will become manda-
tory.
Caches, which occupy most of the area of the chip,
currently have some testing capabilities like ECC or par-
ity that are especially suitable to detect soft and hard
errors in the silicon of memory cells [6], both during
off-line testing and in-the-field operation. However,
errors in combinational logic (decoders, multiplexers)
and wires (bridges or opens in wordlines and routing
wires) are very likely to remain undetected. Thus, low-
cost techniques to detect soft and hard errors during in-
the-field operation are required to protect combinational
parts as well as wires of the arrays of cache memo-
ries. Moreover, such techniques must distinguish soft
and hard errors so we can confine hard errors to the
smallest piece of hardware including the faulty circuit
for hardware reconfiguration.
This paper proposes an on-line mechanism to detect
and confine errors in all components of caches to achieve
full coverage. Our mechanism complements parity/ECC
by detecting errors in wordlines and logic. The key parts
of our technique are as follows:
(i) Memory rows are extended with hardwired signa-
tures to detect any row selection error.
(ii) Column decoders are replicated and signals be-
tween cache arrays are parity protected to detect
errors in the remaining combinational blocks.
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(iii) Few small tables (around 100-bytes in total) are set
up to track errors in such a way that frequent fail-
ures can be confined and repaired.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes our mechanism for failure detection and
confinement. Section 3 evaluates the overhead for dif-
ferent caches. Section 4 reviews some related work.
Finally, Section 5 draws the main conclusions of this
work.
2 On-Line Failure Detection and Confine-
ment in Cache Memories
This section presents our mechanism to detect errors
in combinational blocks of caches. Our proposal allows
detecting both hard and soft errors. Moreover, it clas-
sifies them and isolates defects for hardware reconfigu-
ration. First, we introduce the targeted types of errors.
Then, we describe our techniques for error detection in
the different components of caches and isolation.
2.1 Targeted Errors
Some on-line testing techniques such as parity and
ECC are in place for soft error detection, but they can
also detect some defects [6]. Such techniques are lim-
ited to bit errors in memory cells as well as some faults
in metal layers with limited cost in terms of power, area
and delay. Unfortunately, many faults in combinational
logic and metal layers of caches are left undetected. In
particular, errors detected by parity/ECC correspond to
soft errors and silicon defects in memory cells, defects
affecting metal 1 in memory cells (in-cell connections),
bitline defects, power/ground defects and sense ampli-
fier defects. Any of those errors and defects is expected
to show up in one or few bits of data, and codes such as
parity and ECC are very likely to detect them.
The type of errors that may appear in a cache and are
not covered by parity/ECC are as follows:
(A) Soft errors, and silicon and metal defects in
combinational logic. Some of such faults may
turn into a bit flip (e.g., sense amplifier fault), and
hence, can be detected with parity/ECC, but some
others may cause wrong data to be read/written
(e.g., decoder fault) or a false hit/miss to be re-
ported (e.g., address comparator fault). The case of
reading/writing wrong data is very unlikely to be
detected with parity/ECC. For instance, if a given
byte and its parity bit are written in a wrong loca-
tion the fault will not be detected because data is
consistent from the parity point of view.
(B) Wordline defects (metal 2). Opens and bridges
in wordlines may make either read/write wrong
data or access a wrong location [9]. In the latter
case, since such data is stored jointly with their par-
ity/ECC bits, the fault will not be detected with par-
ity/ECC logic.
(C) Data and address routing. Such wires may expe-
rience opens or bridges [9]. If parity/ECC is not
available for data and address in those wires, faults
will not be detected.
2.2 Error Detection
For the sake of illustration, we use the example in
Figure 1 in the explanation of our techniques. Figure 1
shows the schematic for the data arrays of a 32KB cache
arranged as 4 arrays of 256 rows and 288 columns (256
for data and 32 for parity bits). Grey boxes and straight
lines stand for unmodified blocks and routing wires.
Conversely, black boxes and dotted lines stand for new
blocks and modified routing wires respectively.
The set of solutions that we propose for the different
types of errors are as follows:
Type (A). Soft errors and silicon defects not pro-
tected by parity/ECC correspond basically to decoder
errors (both row and column decoders as well as pre-
decoders) and address comparator faults. Such blocks
can be easily replicated and their outputs compared. The
cost is very low because the original blocks are rather
small and replicas are even smaller because they are not
connected to large transistors feeding long wires (bit-
lines, wordlines and routing wires). Since our mecha-
nism to protect wordlines also detects faults in the row
decoder (see next bullet), such decoder does not have to
be replicated in any of the arrays. Thus, only column
decoders must be replicated in the data side as shown in
Figure 1. Although not shown in the figure, note that an
extra bit must be generated indicating whether both col-
umn decoders in the accessed array provided the same
result.
Type (B). Wordline defects are detected adding a sig-
nature to each wordline. Such signature is a set of ROM
cells that are read every time that a given wordline is
activated. This way we can check whether the proper
wordline was activated by comparing the signature and
those address bits identifying the row to be accessed.
There are two considerations to set up such signatures:
• Any wordline can be activated at any time due to a
bridge with any other wire (e.g., power supply) so
unique signatures are required for wordlines inside
an array. For any array with 2K rows,K bits are re-
quired per row to encode the row address (e.g., sig-
nature 0 for the first row, signature 1 for the second
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Figure 1. Diagram of the data side of a 32KB cache with parity protection extended with features
for on-line error detection
row, and so on and so forth). The number of bits
can be lower to reduce the overhead at the expense
of some aliasing between different rows, which de-
creases the fault detection coverage.
• Given that any wordline may always be low due
to an open or a short with any other wire (e.g.,
ground), all bitlines may be interpreted in a given
direction depending on the bias of latches and sense
amplifiers, and hence, bits may become all ones or
all zeros (e.g., in case of an open all bits are ”0).
Thus, an extra bit set to the opposite value of such
bias is required for each wordline to identify this
particular situation (e.g., the bit is set to ”1). If there
is an open, such bit will have the wrong value (e.g.,
”0) and the fault will be detected.
As we can see in the figure, SRAM arrays are extended
with some ROM cells and the corresponding logic to
read such cells. Note that row decoders do not have to be
replicated because signatures read from ROM cells pro-
tect both wordlines and row decoders. The signature is
compared against the row address (8 out of the 9 signa-
ture bits) and the expected value for the fixed bit. Such
comparison is not shown in the figure, but a small 9-bit
comparator should be included for each SRAM array as
well as a 1-bit signal reporting whether the signature and
the address matched.
Type (C). Data and address routing from/to the tag
and data arrays need parity protection. Such protection
should be in place for any cache protected with parity
(L1 caches) or ECC (L2/L3 caches), but if it is not the
case, we propose to include it. Both data and address
routing wires are parity protected in the example so no
extra protection is required.
2.3 Error Confinement
Once an error is detected, it is crucial to identify
whether it was caused by a soft error or a defect. In
case of having a defect, we would like to disable the
minimum amount of hardware (e.g., a single cache line)
in such a way that the processor keeps operating and
performance impact is minimal. For instance, if we de-
tect a defect in a wordline, only those cache lines using
the faulty wordline should be disabled. To do this we
will include few small tables to track errors at array, ar-
ray row, array column, datum, decoder, comparator and
routing level. The different structures are described in
Table 1.
Since keeping track of errors in all blocks would re-
quire large storage and errors are expected to happen sel-
dom, tables for error tracking will be small (e.g., 8 en-
tries each) with least recently used (LRU) replacement.
Whenever an error is detected, it may be detected in the
decoders, in the comparators, in the routing or in the
arrays. The corresponding tables are updated either in-
serting the new information of the faulty access or in-
crementing the proper error counter if the entry exists.
Whenever a block is faulty its counter saturates rapidly
because errors show up in bursts and can be either de-
activated or repaired. From time to time (e.g., every 1
billion cycles) error counters are either shifted right or
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Table 1. Tables for error confinement
Error location Fields of the table When it is updated
Array Port, Array, #errors (X1+X2+X3 bits) Parity/ECC of data reports an error, the signature is wrong, or the
column decoder and its replica provide different outputs
Array row Port, Array, Row, #errors (X1+X2 bits) Parity/ECC of data reports an error, the signature is wrong, or the
column decoder and its replica provide different outputs
Array column Port, Array, Column, #errors (X1+X2 bits) Parity/ECC of data reports an error, the signature is wrong, or the
column decoder and its replica provide different outputs
Datum Port, Array, Row, Column, #errors (X1 bits) Parity/ECC of data reports an error, the signature is wrong, or the
column decoder and its replica provide different outputs
Decoder Port, Array, #errors (X1+X2 bits) Column decoder and its replica provide different outputs
Comparator Port, Cache way, #errors (Y bits) Address comparator and its replica provide different outputs
Routing Port, Array, #errors (Z bits) Parity/ECC of routing wires reports an error
reset to get rid of faults tracked due to soft errors. Soft
errors are relatively infrequent so even if some errors
are reported due to strikes, neither they will be enough
to saturate any counter, nor they will always happen in
the same block. Thus, soft errors will not cause the de-
activation of any operating block.
Note that the sizes of the counters must meet some
constraints to ensure that fine-grain errors are not con-
sidered coarse-grain errors. For instance, many errors in
a given array column will saturate the counter for such
column, but will not be enough to saturate the corre-
sponding counter for the array, which needs more errors
to saturate. Similarly, errors in a column will distribute
across different rows and data, and hence, row and da-
tum counters will not saturate. In fact, row and datum
tables are very likely to evict entries because errors will
happen at different locations from their point of view,
whereas such errors will happen in the same location
from the column point of view. All those constraints are
met by ensuring that errors in a given datum (counters
ofX1 bits) saturate neither array column and row coun-
ters (X1+X2 > X1) nor the array counter (X1+X2+X3
> X1), and errors in a given column or row do not sat-
urate the array counter (X1+X2+X3 > X1+X2). Note
that X1, X2, X3, Y and Z are greater than zero to track
errors and meet those constraints.
Once a block is considered to be faulty it will be
disabled, which can be done using hardware fuses to
permanently invalidate the block, or storing fault infor-
mation in non-volatile memory (e.g., in the BIOS) to
be read at boot time. In fact, redundant hardware not
used at fabrication may be available and can be used to
replace the faulty block. Nevertheless, how the faulty
block is disabled or replaced is out of the scope of this
paper.
3 Evaluation
This section evaluates our set of techniques for two
different cache configurations resembling an L1 and an
L2 cache. We describe the evaluation methodology and
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Figure 2. Vcc, Vss and bitline layout for
SRAM and ROM cells
present results for both cache configurations as well as
an example of the operation of error confinement tables.
3.1 Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation has been done using CACTI 4.0 [24],
which is a timing, power and area model for cache-like
structures. Replicated components have been incorpo-
rated in the power and area calculation. Since CACTI
does not model ROM cells needed for wordline signa-
tures, we model them as SRAM cells. We have in-
corporated ROM cells based on regular SRAM cell de-
signs [3, 13], where bitlines are interleaved with Vcc
and Vss lines as shown in Figure 2. ROM cells re-
quire a single bitline given that they are connected di-
rectly to Vcc/Vss, and hence their read speed is very high
(differential signaling is not required). ROM cells re-
quire much smaller area than conventional 6-T SRAM
cells [3, 13]. Therefore, bitlines, Vcc and Vss wires
could be laid out in a more compressed manner for ROM
cells than for SRAM cells. However, to keep regular-
ity, which is important for yield [18], we assume the
same wire layout as for the rest of the array (see Fig-
ure 2). Such assumption is detrimental for our approach
because increases the area devoted to the ROM cells of
wordline signatures, but it is the most realistic assump-
tion.
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Table 2. Configuration of L1 tables for er-
ror confinement
Field size Total bits
Table Port Array Row Col Way #errors (8 entries)
Array 1 3 - - - 8 96
Array row 1 3 8 - - 6 144
Array column 1 3 - 2 - 6 96
Datum 1 3 8 2 - 5 152
Decoder 1 3 - - - 6 80
Comparator 1 - - - 2 4 56
Routing 1 3 - - - 4 64
688 bits
Table 3. Configuration of L2 tables for er-
ror confinement
Field size Total bits
Table Port Array Row Col Way #errors (8 entries)
Array 0 4 - - - 8 96
Array row 0 4 10 - - 6 160
Array column 0 4 - 5 - 6 120
Datum 0 4 10 5 - 5 192
Decoder 0 4 - - - 6 80
Comparator 0 - - - 2 4 48
Routing 0 4 - - - 4 64
760 bits
3.2 Results
We have evaluated our mechanism for two different
caches implemented with 65nm technology: (i) a par-
ity protected L1 data cache 32KB 4-way 64 bytes/line,
with 1 read and 1 write ports, arranged as 4 data arrays
of 256x288 bits each and 4 tag arrays of 64x204 bits
each, and (ii) an ECC protected L2 cache 2MB 4-way
64 bytes/line, with 1 read/write port, arranged as 8 data
arrays of 1024x2304 bits and 4 tag arrays of 512x180
bits. Error confinement table configurations are reported
in Tables 2 and 3. As shown, the L2 cache does not re-
quire any bit to identify the port where errors happen be-
cause there is a single port. Column errors are tracked at
8-byte level for both caches (the largest size for a single
datum). The number of bits of the L1 cache confinement
tables is less than 0.3% that of the L1 cache itself. In the
case of the L2 cache such ratio is 0.005%. Overall, the
overhead of confinement tables is negligible.
Table 4 shows the overheads (hardware to detect and
confine errors) in terms of power and area for both
caches. For the sake of illustration we also report the
cost of memory cells for parity/ECC (assuming an over-
head of 8 bits per 64 bits of data). As shown, our mecha-
nism raises the coverage to full coverage for hard errors
at low cost. The area overhead for the 32KB L1 cache is
3.6% and corresponds mainly to the wordline signatures.
Such overhead is lower for the large L2 cache because its
data arrays are larger, and thus, the relative cost of ROM
Table 4. Overhead of our technique and
parity/ECC in terms of area and power
Our approach Parity/ECCCache size Area Power Area Power
32KB L1 3.6% 3.0% 11.3% 11.0%
2MB L2 1.3% 4.4% 12.4% 10.1%
cells is lower. If wordline partitioning [10, 23] was used
the area cost would raise, but in any reasonable config-
uration the area overhead would remain well below 5%.
Nevertheless, the area cost can be reduced by reducing
the size of the signatures at the expense of some aliasing
as explained before.
It can be observed that the cost of parity/ECC is sig-
nificantly higher than that of our set of techniques. This
gives a point of reference for the overheads of our mech-
anism and shows that it is reasonable including the extra
hardware for soft and hard error detection and confine-
ment.
3.3 Example of Error Confinement Op-
eration
In order to illustrate the operation of error confine-
ment tables we show an example corresponding to the
L1 cache. In the example we emulate the behavior of our
scheme in the presence of a defect affecting the whole
row 37 in array 1. Consider the case where 64 consecu-
tive accesses to row 37 in array 1 are performed (other
accesses to other arrays or other rows in array 1 may
occur in-between but no errors are detected). Since each
datum is 72-bits wide (64 bits for data and 8 for parity),
we distinguish only 4 columns per array. The following
distribution of errors is obtained:
• Array 1, row 37, column 1: 25 errors.
• Array 1, row 37, column 2: 19 errors.
• Array 1, row 37, column 3: 11 errors.
• Array 1, row 37, column 4: 9 errors.
This would lead to the following list of errors tracked
in the different tables:
• Array Table
– Array 1: 64 errors (saturates at 256).
• Array Row Table
– Array 1, row 37: 64 errors (saturates at 64).
• Array Column Table
– Array 1, column 1: 25 errors (saturates at 64).
– Array 1, column 2: 19 errors (saturates at 64).
– Array 1, column 3: 11 errors (saturates at 64).
– Array 1, column 4: 9 errors (saturates at 64).
• Array Datum Table
– Array 1, row 37, column 1: 25 errors (saturates at
32).
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– Array 1, row 37, column 2: 19 errors (saturates at
32).
– Array 1, row 37, column 3: 11 errors (saturates at
32).
– Array 1, row 37, column 4: 9 errors (saturates at
32).
As shown, the only counter saturating would be the
one corresponding to the row 37 in array 1. Note that 32
or more accesses out of the 64 total accesses might occur
in the same datum (e.g., array 1, row 37, column 1). In
this case the counter for such datum would saturate first
and the datum would be deactivated. However, further
accesses to the row 37 would either disable the remain-
ing data of this row one by one, or the full row. At the
end, the whole row would be disabled, as desired.
4 Related Work
Mechanisms for off-line testing at fabrication have
been proposed in the past [26]. However, such mecha-
nisms rely on some Automated Test Equipment (ATE)
to inject the proper inputs to perform the tests. Off-
line mechanisms have been extended to perform tests
without any ATE [19], but they are still focused on off-
line testing at fabrication to prevent faulty processors
to be shipped. Some works have shown that slightly
defective processors can be also shipped for yield in-
crease [16, 25]. Although off-line testing mechanisms
can be used for on-line testing, they may miss a signifi-
cant number of faults that may show up intermittently.
Since defects are expected to produce faults progres-
sively, they will manifest only under certain environ-
mental conditions (temperature, voltage, noise, cross-
talk, etc.) and continuous on-line testing will be required
to detect them timely.
Caches have some on-line testing features like parity
or ECC [6], so many errors can be detected, but errors in
wordlines, decoders, comparators and other circuits are
not detected.
Some mechanisms check the outputs of the program
instead of using codes. Brute force mechanisms are used
to perform such coarse-grain checking. Typically reexe-
cution is employed to produce the outputs twice or more
times, and compare them to identify wrong results. For
instance, lockstep [5], DIVA [2] and redundant multi-
threading either in a single SMT core [20] or in sepa-
rate cores [15] are examples of coarse-grain concurrent
testing. Most of those techniques do not replicate cache
accesses [2,5,15,20], and thus, those errors not detected
by parity or ECC are neither detected by those reexecu-
tion mechanisms. Only some implementations of lock-
step [5] detect such errors, but the cost is huge in power
(more than 2X), area (two cores are required to execute a
single program) and performance. Moreover, errors are
not confined so further techniques are required to iden-
tify the faulty component.
Synthetic program execution has been proposed as a
method to force some errors to show up [17, 22]. Syn-
thetic programs are run on the core and their output is
compared against the expected output. The main dis-
advantage of those techniques is the fact that many er-
rors are missed (i.e., soft errors) even if synthetic pro-
gram execution is performed at worst-than-real execu-
tion conditions [22] (i.e., overclocking the processor)
and errors are not confined. Other techniques based on
periodic tests have been proposed [7,21]. However, such
techniques have the same disadvantage as synthetic pro-
gram execution because soft errors and many hard errors
showing up intermittently are missed. Thus, continuous
dynamic testing is much more suitable to detect errors
timely.
To the best of our knowledge our set of techniques
is the first approach to detect errors and confine them
for hardware reconfiguration at low cost. Errors are de-
tected concurrently with execution, so our technique is
useful for both post-silicon testing and in-the-field error
detection. Moreover, error confinement features are key
to debug and find error location.
5 Conclusions
New process generations constrain burn-in capabili-
ties thus increasing in-the-field fault rates. Parity and
ECC are effective to detect soft errors and defects in bit-
cells of cache-like structures dynamically, but many soft
errors and defects in logic require further error detection
mechanisms. Thus, techniques to detect different types
of errors in cache memory logic are required as well as
methods to confine errors for efficient hardware recon-
figuration. In this paper we present solutions to protect
those components of caches that parity and ECC leave
unprotected. In particular, the contributions of this pa-
per are as follows:
(i) Memory rows are extended with hardwired signa-
tures to detect faults in wordlines and row decoders,
which represent most of the devices left unpro-
tected by parity/ECC.
(ii) The remaining combinational blocks (column de-
coders and comparators) are replicated and signals
between cache arrays are parity protected.
(iii) By tracking the location and frequency of errors,
we can classify them into soft and hard, and can
confine defects so that the minimum amount of
hardware needs to be reconfigured.
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We show that any kind of error left undetected in
caches by parity/ECC can be detected and confined with
power and area overheads largely below those of parity
or ECC for both L1 and L2 caches.
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